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Regulating Commercial Contracts: What can 
we Learn from Part II of the Housing Grants, 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996? 
Charlotte Ellis* 
I. Introduction 
The scholarship of commercial contracts in the twenty-first century has a blind spot. 
Few today would deny Macneil’s argument that contracts are socially embedded, and 
that co-operative and trusting relationships are essential to successful commercial 
activity.1 The findings of ground-breaking empirical work by Stuart Macaulay in the US,2 
replicated by and Beale and Dugdale in England and Wales,3 have been similarly 
absorbed. It is taken for granted by contract scholars that trusting and co-operative 
commercial relationships can and do flourish without direct recourse to the legal 
system, because non-legal sanctions and the parties’ mutual self-interest in the 
continued relationship will generally do the work. But underlying the reception of these 
insights is an unwarranted assumption that inequality of bargaining power in 
commercial contexts, if it exists at all, is rarely a barrier to the creation of trust and co-
operation.  
 The fact that inequalities of power do exist in commercial contexts, and their 
very real capacity to obstruct the creation of trust and co-operation if not regulated, is a 
blind spot in current contract scholarship. Statutes which perform this regulatory role, 
such as Pt II of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (HGCRA), 
are overlooked, and their implications are not explored. We focus on socio-legal studies 
of markets where inequalities of power are regulated by non-legal forces or 
institutions.4 Empirical work on markets where powerful actors are not constrained in 
                                                             
* This work was supported by the Arts & Humanities Research Council (grant number 
AH/L503848/1) through the White Rose College of the Arts & Humanities. I am very grateful to 
TT Arvind and Jenny Steele for their helpful comments on drafts of this chapter, and to David 
Campbell for suggestions on a very early version. Any mistakes are my own. 
1 See generally ZX Tan, ‘Disrupting doctrine? Revisiting the doctrinal impact of relational contract 
theory’ (2019) 39 Legal Studies 98. Of course, the legal relevance of these insights remains 
contested. 
2 S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 American 
Sociological Review 55. 
3 H Beale and T Dugdale, ‘Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual 
Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
4 The markets considered in the studies listed in nn 2 and 3 above share this feature, as do the 
markets considered in Lisa Bernstein’s influential work on private legal systems.  
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this way, raising the important question of law’s role in this very different situation, has 
not received the attention it deserves.5  
 This chapter seeks to bring these matters into our field of vision, and to consider 
their implications. It argues that importance of contract law in supporting commerce by 
promoting trust and co-operation, and the ways in which it does so, varies significantly 
according to the context in which a commercial relationship is embedded. Law can in 
principle perform two key functions in this regard: it can provide sanctions for breach of 
contract, and it can regulate inequality by curbing the ability of powerful actors to use 
their advantage in ways which are likely to undermine trust and co-operation. In some 
contexts, both of these functions may be performed entirely by non-legal forces or 
institutions. In others, legal sanctions and regulation play a background role. But where 
a market contains significant inequalities of power which are not regulated by non-legal 
means, law can and does operate in the foreground: its sanctions and regulation can be a 
crucial factor in facilitating trust and co-operation.  
 Contract scholars should not ignore or marginalise the markets where law 
performs these regulatory tasks. Nor should we assume that the regulation of inequality 
in commercial relationships is unnecessary. And we should not assume that law is 
incapable of providing such regulation where non-legal forces or institutions do not. 
Instead, we should consider the dynamics of this form of legal regulation, and the ways 
in which its inherent challenges can be and have been met. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II identifies the blind spot in contract 
scholarship, showing how leading theories fail to address the regulation of inequality in 
commercial contracting. Section III sets out the argument that the importance and role 
of law in supporting trust and co-operation in commercial relationships varies with 
context. It is argued that contract law should be viewed as just one element of the 
contractual environment within which individual commercial relationships occur. 
Existing empirical work is used to demonstrate the importance of sanctions and the 
regulation of inequality in promoting trust and co-operation in commercial markets, 
whether provided by legal or non-legal techniques. A key element in the contractual 
environment is the presence, or absence, of system trust – a level of trust among market 
participants which is generated by normative structures operating in the market as a 
whole, as distinct from the trust created by the parties to particular transactions or 
relationships. Evidence is highlighted which shows that the non-legal institutions which 
generate system trust in other jurisdictions tend to be weaker in England and Wales, 
with the result that legal sanctions and regulation assume a greater role.  
 Section IV demonstrates the importance of legal sanctions and regulation in 
supporting trust and co-operation by looking in depth at the case of construction 
contracts, which in the UK are regulated by the HGCRA. This interventionist statute, 
which receives little attention in work on commercial contracts, can be seen as a direct 
response to a crisis of trust and co-operation in the UK construction industry. The 
reports which preceded its enactment paint a striking picture of a commercial market 
where the absence of effective legal or non-legal sanctions for breach of contract, 
combined with a lack of effective regulation of inequalities between different market 
actors, undermined system trust. This challenging contractual environment, and in 
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particular the lack of constraints on the ability of powerful commercial actors to use 
their advantage in damaging ways, meant that the parties to individual transactions 
struggled to create even basic levels of trust and co-operation. Unable to resolve these 
problems for themselves, construction industry bodies looked to the Government to 
help them identify and implement effective solutions to the lack of trust in their market. 
This resulted in a joint government–industry review of contracting and procurement 
arrangements in the construction industry, known as the Latham Review. 
Section V considers the role of legislative reform of contract law in the package of 
recommendations arising from the Latham Review. The primary recommendation was 
that the industry should move away from the somewhat classical and adversarial 
approach to contracting found in its most commonly used standard forms of contract, in 
favour of the more relational approach found in the (then) recently introduced New 
Engineering Contract (NEC), which emphasised and incentivised co-operation, planning 
and the sharing of risk. But, recognising the inherent limitations of the standard forms 
as a means of regulation, it was also recommended that a legislative underpinning 
should be given to two elements of the NEC’s approach which were considered key to 
the creation of trust and co-operation. The legislative underpinning would ensure that 
these elements could not be removed by parties exercising their freedom of contract 
under the general law.  
 The two elements so identified demonstrate the potential importance of legal 
sanctions and the legal regulation of inequality in facilitating trust and co-operation in 
commercial relationships in this context. The first concerned sanctions. The Latham 
Review recommended that construction contracts should be legally required to contain 
terms which provided for adjudication – a quick, cost-effective form of ADR which 
resulted in a legally enforceable sanction for breach of contract. It was also 
recommended that the payment procedures in construction contracts should be legally 
required to contain certain features which would ensure adjudication operated 
effectively in payment disputes. The second element regulated inequality more directly. 
The Review recommended that ‘pay-when-paid clauses’, a widely used payment 
arrangement under which the right to payment was made conditional on the paying 
party’s receipt of funds from a third party, should be rendered legally invalid. This 
would remove the ability of more powerful parties to impose these onerous terms on 
weaker parties. The HGCRA substantially adopted these recommendations, despite their 
significant interference with freedom of contract. 
 Section VI considers the question of how the kind of regulation found in the 
HGCRA, and the ways in which it seeks to overcome the inherent challenges of 
regulating commercial activity, can be theorised. Discussions of these difficulties in 
contract scholarship tend to focus on substantive or command and control regulatory 
approaches, overlooking Teubner’s more promising concept of reflexive law.6 The 
HGCRA could be seen as an example of reflexive law. However, Teubner’s concept does 
not capture two important features which are key to its regulatory strategy. The first is 
the close involvement of construction industry and client bodies in the process which 
led to the HGCRA’s enactment and in determining its contents. The second is the way in 
which, as a result of gaps which were consciously left in the statute, the courts were 
                                                             




required to complete its regulatory scheme by devising the new legal rules and 
principles which would govern adjudication enforcement. In the light of these features, 
it is argued that the HGCRA can be better understood using a new concept: responsive 
reflexivity.  
II. A Blind Spot in Contract Scholarship 
The blind spot in contract scholarship arises in part from a common starting point that, 
although the function of commercial contract law is to support the market, its role in 
doing so is in practice somewhat secondary or indirect. For example, David Campbell 
characterises contract law as playing an important background role in supporting 
commercial relations. Campbell highlights the ways in which the legal rules on remedies 
for breach of contract incentivise co-operative behaviour following a breach of contract, 
7 and shows how other rules of contract law can undermine co-operation by providing 
the occasion for opportunism. 8  
 Campbell argues that aspects of the rules of classical contract law are unsuited 
to the needs of more complex, relational contracts but emphasises the need for 
competent commercial parties to use appropriate drafting techniques to mitigate these 
problems,9 citing Macneil’s comprehensive guide, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’.10 For 
Macneil, however, sophisticated drafting was only part of the story. He acknowledged 
that legislative intervention might also be needed to support the robust operation of the 
common contract norms in particular spheres of activity, especially those involving 
more complex, relational contracts and / or imbalances of power.11 This form of 
‘relational contract law’,12 of which the HGCRA is an example, receives little attention in 
discussions of commercial contract law. Its operation goes beyond the background role 
which Campbell identifies. 
                                                             
7 D Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Remedy: Co-operation as the Implicit Second 
Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract’ (2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 455. 
8 D Campbell, ‘Arcos v Ronaasen as a relational contract’ in D Campbell, L Mulcahy and S Wheeler 
(eds), Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
9 D Campbell, ‘What Do We Mean by the Non-Use of Contract’ in J Braucher, J Kidwell and W C 
Whitford (eds), Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2013) 171–73. 
10 IR Macneil, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1974–1975) 48 Southern California Law Review 
627. 
11See I Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, 
Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law’ (1977–1978) 72 Northwestern University Law Review 
854, 881–83 and IR Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’ (2000) 94 
Northwestern University Law Review 877, 893 and 899. Macneil was clear that whether such 
support should be extended, as opposed to simply leaving the relationship to degenerate, was a 
separate question. 
12 Macneil, ‘Challenges and Queries’ (ibid) 897–99. 
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 A more circumscribed account of law’s role in supporting commercial markets is 
found in Hugh Collins’ Regulating Contracts.13 Collins’ starting point is that the 
constitution of markets requires the presence of trust, effective sanctions against 
disappointment and betrayal, or a combination of these two factors.14 Drawing on 
empirical studies by Macaulay and others, Collins argues that the role of contract law in 
creating these conditions is minimal. Trust arises primarily from prior dealings between 
the parties or from ties of kinship or ethnicity, which have nothing to do with law. Non-
legal sanctions such as loss of future business, supplemented by security sanctions such 
as the taking of a deposit, provide the main incentive against betrayal or 
disappointment. The possibility of seeking enforcement of a contractual obligation or 
compensation for breach through the courts plays a very minor role. Collins suggests 
that the parties will only concern themselves with the question of whether their 
agreement is legally enforceable if trust is absent and there are no clear incentives, such 
as non-legal sanctions, to fulfil the expectations under the transaction.15 The implication 
seems to be that such situations are very rare. 
 Collins accepts that the legal rights and obligations contained in the contract 
play a background role during the course of a contractual relationship even though, for 
the most part, the parties will act according to the different norms and understandings 
found in their business relationship and the economic deal which underpins it.16 In 
principle, then, the terms of the contract might usefully be the subject of regulation 
designed to enhance trust and therefore efficiency.17 But he sees only a limited role for 
such regulation in commercial contexts. The possibility that legislative intervention 
might be needed to qualify or redistribute power in order to enhance trust in 
commercial relationships is considered as part of a wider discussion of how the law 
should respond to contracts which appear on their face to create a relationship of power 
and dominance.18 Two categories of commercial contract are identified as potential 
candidates for such regulation: symbiotic contracts (such as contracts of agency or 
franchise) 19 and hybrid or multi-party organisation contracts (such as the contracts 
which govern relationship between a trade union and its members, or the supra-
contractual governance structures which, on Collins’ account, govern relations between 
the numerous individual firms involved in a large building project).20 But Collins’ 
suggestions are tentative, and in the case of hybrid contracts he emphasises the need to 
preserve the balance of interests set by the parties’ own self-regulation.21 Collins does 
not consider the possibility that this balance of interests might itself need to be 
regulated to ensure it is set in a way that promotes, rather than undermines, trust and 
                                                             
13 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
14 ibid ch 5. 
15 ibid 123.  
16 ibid. 
17 ibid 241, 252. 
18 ibid ch 10. 
19 ibid 239–46. 
20 ibid 246–54. 
21 ibid 252. 
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co-operation. Existing legal regulation which seeks to do this, such as the HGCRA, is not 
brought into the discussion. 
 In Contract Law Minimalism,22 Jonathan Morgan argues that law’s role in the 
commercial sphere is even more limited. Morgan shares Collins’ starting point that the 
function of commercial contract law is to provide a workable framework for business 
transactions, 23 and his acceptance that such a framework should support trust and co-
operation in the relationships within which transactions are embedded.24 However, 
where Collins perceives a background role for the parties’ contractual rights and 
obligations throughout their relationship,25 Morgan argues that law only becomes 
relevant when their relationship has irretrievably broken down and they seek 
resolution of their dispute through litigation. Before this point, commercial relationships 
‘broadly look after themselves (being backed by social norms and the promise of mutual 
gain from on-going co-operation)’.26 The idea that commercial parties will successfully 
create and maintain co-operative and trusting relationships if left to their own devices is 
a key strand in Morgan’s argument that the content of commercial contract law should 
be minimal. The possibility that, where inequality is present, they might need greater 
regulatory assistance from the law appears to be ruled out.27 Empirical evidence which 
shows this can be the case, and legislation such as the HGCRA, which responds to the 
need for greater regulation in this situation, is not considered.  
III. Re-framing the Inquiry 
One explanation for the failure of contract scholarship to explore more fully the 
regulation of inequality in commercial contracts is that the leading theoretical accounts, 
and much of the empirical work on which they are based, are legal-centric inquiries. 
They start with law, asking what role it plays in supporting trust and co-operation in 
commercial relationships. A different picture is revealed if we start with the 
phenomenon of trust itself, asking the broader question of how trust and co-operation 
are generated in commercial relationships. Approached in this way, empirical studies by 
Macaulay,28 Lisa Bernstein29 and others, which are often taken to show the limited role 
                                                             
22 J Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism – A Formalist Restatement of Commercial Contract Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
23 ibid 89. 
24 ibid 123. 
25 Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) ch 3. 
26 Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (2013) 99. 
27 See, for example, ibid 109: ‘[A]llowing the failure of sub-rational businesses will have a positive 
effect on overall market efficiency in a kind of “creative destruction” or Darwinian survival of the 
fittest. Intervention can always be based on the economic pretext of “market failure”. But 
effective laws against fraud and monopoly should ensure a basically level playing field.’ 
28 Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’ (1963). 
29 L Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724; L Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law 
in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms’ (1996) 144 
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of law, appear in a new light. What they suggest is that sanctions and the regulation of 
inequality can be crucial to the creation of trust. They provide evidence that markets 
exist where the necessary sanctions and regulation are provided by non-legal forces or 
institutions. But this evidence does not, in itself, answer the question of how law should 
respond when such non-legal regulation is absent. 
 A more fruitful way of approaching this question, consistently with the insights 
of relational contract theory, is to view contract law as just one part of the broader 
context in which any given commercial relationship occurs. This approach was taken in 
a body of work arising from a major interdisciplinary study of commercial relationships 
between manufacturers and suppliers in Britain, Germany and Italy, which will be 
referred to here as ‘the Cambridge Study’. 30 Rather than seeking to investigate the 
influence of law specifically, the Cambridge Study asked the more open question of how 
trust between firms was generated.31 The researchers, drawn from the fields of 
economics, management and business, organisational science and sociology as well as 
law, gathered a comprehensive set of contextual empirical data on two sample 
industries, kitchen furniture manufacturing and mining machinery manufacturing, and 
examined it from a range of perspectives. By using a comparative methodology they 
were able to explore more fully the ways in which law can contribute to the construction 
of trust. Their findings demonstrate the importance of sanctions and external 
constraints on the ability of powerful firms to fully exploit their advantage in facilitating 
the creation of trust and co-operation. They also suggest that although such sanctions 
and constraints can be created by non-legal institutions and frameworks, law can play 
an important role in contexts where such non-legal structures are lacking. 
A. System Trust and the Contractual Environment 
The work arising from the Cambridge Study used two key concepts in examining the 
link between trust in commercial relationships and their broader context, which 
enabled them to consider this link in greater depth. The first is the contractual 
environment, which captures ‘the social, institutional and organisational context’ within 
which individual contracts in a given market are embedded.32 It includes  
                                                                                                                                                                              
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765; L Bernstein, ‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of 
Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law 
Review 710; and L Bernstein, ‘Opting out of the Legal System:Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115. 
30 The full title of this project was the UK ESRC Contracts and Competition Programme (award 
number L114251016, ‘Vertical Contracts, Incentives and Competition’). Details of the project can 
be found in S Deakin and J Michie, ‘Contracts and competition: an introduction’ (1997) 21 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 121. 
31 ibid. The particular focus was on close, inter-firm co-operation between manufacturers and 
suppliers in vertical supply chains. 
32 A Arrighetti, R Bachmann and S Deakin, ‘Contract law, social norms and inter-firm co-
operation’ (1997) 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics 171. See also B Burchell and F Wilkinson, 
‘Trust, business relationships and the contractual environment’ (1997) 21 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 217, 221. 
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the broad normative framework of laws, customs and assumptions within which inter-
firm relations are embedded … as well as other factors which might affect the form 
and content of contracts such as the available state of know-how, technology and the 
structure of the markets concerned. 33  
The second key concept is system trust. This is a level of trust between participants in a 
market which is generated by normative structures operating within the market itself.34 
These normative structures might be formal and institutional (eg the rules of a trade 
association, the rules of contract law) or informal and social (eg a stable norm of 
commercially acceptable behaviour in a given field of commerce).35  
B. System Trust and Non-legal Regulation 
The potential impact of system trust on overall levels of trust and co-operation in a 
commercial market is demonstrated by the striking contrast between Britain and 
Germany, which is identified in the outputs arising from the Cambridge Study. In 
Germany the researchers found high levels of system trust, combined with high levels of 
trust in individual commercial relationships, close forms of inter-firm co-operation and 
low levels of conflict. Litigation to enforce contractual obligations was extremely rare.36 
In Britain, by contrast, very little system trust was found in the two sample industries. 
The lack of system trust, and the resulting pressure on the parties to individual 
transactions to create trust for themselves, meant that co-operation between firms took 
more limited forms, and levels of conflict and resort to litigation were much higher.37  
 The primary factor in creating system trust in Germany was identified as the 
existence of a stable framework of legal and extra-legal norms whose contents were well 
known and taken for granted by both suppliers and manufacturers as standards of 
appropriate commercial behaviour.38 Legal norms formed part of this normative 
framework: German firms entered formal, comprehensive contracts and their 
employees had a clear understanding of their legal obligations and of what the outcome 
                                                             
33 ibid 176. 
34 ibid 175–76. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid 187–88. 
37 ibid 187–89, 191. 
38 S Deakin and F Wilkinson, ‘Contract Law and the Economics of Interorganizational Trust’ in C 
Lane and R Bachmann (eds), Trust Within and Between Organisations: Conceptual Issues and 
Empirical Applications (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) 157. 
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of litigation might be.39 But extra-legal norms and institutions, in particular those 
generated and enforced by trade associations, were equally important.40 
 A second factor identified as promoting trust and co-operation in the German 
sample industries was the content of this stable framework of norms and standards. 
Many of the norms, particularly those created and enforced by trade associations, 
operated to curb the ability of more powerful firms to fully exploit their advantage 
where this would be damaging to other firms, or to the interests of the industry as a 
whole.41 For example, trade bodies in both industries produced General Conditions of 
Business which, whilst formally optional, were in very wide use.42 The existence of these 
General Conditions of Business, and their contents, provided an effective means of 
protection for smaller supplier firms against larger buyer firms who might otherwise 
seek to impose more onerous terms when negotiating contracts.43 Similarly, trade 
associations used competition rules and recommendations to define and publicise 
acceptable market behaviour, and to stigmatise transgressions which might harm other 
participants in the market.44 And finally, many of the norms in this framework, including 
legal norms, expressed or presupposed values of co-operation and mutuality as opposed 
to the untrammelled pursuit of individual self-interest. This may also have had some 
impact on the ability of powerful actors to pursue their self-interest in harmful ways. 45 
 Payment terms provide a good example of these techniques in action. In 
Germany, payment periods in both industries were set at 30 days by trade association 
recommendations, and so in practice did not become a battleground in contractual 
negotiations at the level of individual transactions. The reputational damage which 
would result from a failure to pay on time, together with a practice of offering a modest 
discount for timely payment, ensured that prompt payment was the norm and resort to 
legal or non-legal enforcement mechanisms was extremely rare.46 
 Overall, a picture emerges of a contractual environment in Germany in which 
commercial activity was highly regulated, albeit by a combination of mutually 
supportive legal and non-legal techniques. The parties to individual contracts had less 
work to do in creating trust, because in important areas such as payment and quality, 
trust had been created for them at the system level by the stable and ‘taken-for-granted’ 
                                                             
39 S Deakin, C Lane and F Wilkinson, ‘Contract Law, Trust Relations and Incentives for Co-
operation:A Comparative Study’ in S Deakin and J Mitchie (eds), Contracts, Co-operation and 
Conpetition: Studies in Economics, Management and Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997) 
131. 
40 See generally C Lane, ‘The social regulation of inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany: 
market rules, legal norms and technical standards’ (1997) 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics 
197. 
41 C Lane and R Bachmann, ‘Co-operation in inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany: the role 
of social institutions’ (1997) 48 British Journal of Sociology 226, 239–40. 
42 Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson, ‘Contract Law, Trust Relations’ (1997) 112. 
43 ibid. 
44 Lane and Bachmann, ‘Co-operation in inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany’ (1997) 240. 
45 Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin, ‘Contract law’ (1997) 178.  
46 Lane and Bachmann (n 41) 240. 
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framework of legal and extra-legal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour. But the 
creation of trust in individual transactions was also assisted by the various ways in 
which this normative framework regulated inequalities of power between commercial 
actors.  
C. The Role of Law where Non-legal Regulation is Weak 
The picture of the contractual environment in Britain revealed in the Cambridge Study 
provided a stark contrast to the findings in relation to Germany. The researchers found 
no equivalent of Germany’s stable system of legal and extra-legal norms. This was linked 
to the absence, in the British contractual environment, of strong trade associations. 
German trade associations, which were ‘powerful forces in German industry and 
society’,47 could set and enforce norms of market behaviour for entire industries. By 
contrast, most British trade associations were a ‘negligible force’48 and could not 
perform this function. Against this background, the commonly expressed view among 
English interviewees that personal relationships were the key to creating trust49 was 
only part of the story. The evidence suggested that the availability of effective legal 
sanctions for breach of contract was also important.50 The legal system can perhaps be 
seen as providing an essential if minimum level of system trust. Across both industries 
studied, British firms were significantly less certain about the likely outcomes of 
litigation than their German counterparts, but much more likely to take legal action 
against a contracting partner, particularly for breach of a payment obligation.51 Late or 
non-payment of commercial debts was identified as a pervasive problem in the UK, and 
the primary response to this problem was litigation. 
 A further consequence of the lack of strong trade associations in the British 
contractual environment was that any regulation of contract terms in the industries 
studied, and in particular any curbs on the ability of powerful firms to exploit their 
advantage in damaging ways when negotiating contracts, had to come from elsewhere. 
The British kitchen furniture industry, where dealings between manufacturers and 
suppliers involved relatively simple or ‘discrete’ contracts for the sale of generic screws 
and hinges, had no history of standard form contracts or other kinds of self-regulation, 
but exhibited no obvious problems arising from inequalities of market power. But 
matters were different in the mining machinery sector, where contracts between 
manufacturers and subcontractors or suppliers were more complex and involved the 
supply of made-to-order components. Deakin et al noted that although collectively 
agreed standard form contracts did exist in the British mining manufacturing industry, 
their use was in decline. Some buyers in the newly privatised industries had abandoned 
the industry standard forms, preferring to impose harsh new terms on manufacturers. 
This had in turn caused manufacturers to pressurise their subcontractors, leading to 
                                                             
47 Deakin, Lane and Wilkinson (n 39) 114. 
48 ibid 115. 
49 Burchell and Wilkinson, ‘Trust’ (1997) 226. 
50 Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin (n 32) 187–88. 
51 ibid.  
1 
 
negative effects on trust and co-operation throughout the supply chain.52 English 
contract law, with its emphasis on autonomy and freedom of contract, offered nothing to 
fill this regulatory gap. 
 The work arising from the Cambridge Study directs our attention to the 
important question of how the law should support commercial relationships in contexts 
where effective non-legal sanctions and regulation are lacking. Existing contract 
scholarship has not adequately addressed this question. But it can be addressed by 
studying particular contract types which have their own regime of legal regulation. By 
asking why and how such regulation came into being, how it operates in practice, and 
how it seeks to overcome the inherent challenges of regulating commercial activity, we 
can build a more complete picture of the relationship between law and contracting 
practice. 
 The remainder of this chapter begins the task by examining the HGCRA, a highly 
interventionist statute which regulates construction contracts for work carried out in 
England, Wales or Scotland.53 The origins of this statute in the Latham Review are 
considered, together with the Review’s findings. These findings reveal the UK 
construction market in the 1990s as a commercial context in which sanctions and 
regulation of inequality were needed to facilitate the creation of trust and co-operation, 
but were not being provided by either legal or non-legal means. Unable to resolve these 
problems for themselves, construction industry bodies actively sought government 
assistance in both identifying and implementing regulatory solutions through the 
vehicle of the Latham Review. The legislative proposals arising from the Review, and in 
particular those which were ultimately enacted in the HGCRA, provide an example of the 
ways in which legislative intervention in particular contract types can provide the 
regulation and sanctions which are needed to support trusting and co-operative 
relationships. 
IV. ‘Trust and Money’ – The Origins of the HGCRA 
A. The Latham Review 
The Latham Review was announced by the Government in July 1993 as an initiative 
aimed at improving relationships in the construction industry. The objective would be to 
identify practical reforms which would ‘reduce conflict and litigation and … encourage 
productivity and competitiveness’.54 The review was jointly funded by the Government 
and organisations representing the different parts of the construction industry (‘the four 
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53 Pursuant to s 104(7), the HGCRA applies irrespective of whether the contract itself is governed 
by English or Scottish law. The meaning of ‘construction contract’ is carefully defined in ss 104–
05 and particular subsectors of the construction industry, such as process plant engineering, are 
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funding bodies’): the Construction Industry Council (CIC), representing professional 
consultants such as architects, engineers and surveyors; the Construction Industry 
Employers’ Council (CIEC) representing main contracting firms; the National Specialist 
Contractors Council (NSCC), representing specialist and trade subcontractors, and the 
Specialist Engineering Contractors Group (SECG) representing specialist engineering 
subcontractors. It can be seen at once why this industry might struggle to regulate its 
own affairs without assistance. The different categories of firm involved in the 
construction process each had their own trade association and there was no 
overarching body which could provide a forum for co-ordinated action or the balancing 
of competing interests.55  
 The origins of the Review are described in Adams and Pollington, Change In the 
Construction Industry – Account of the UK Construction Industry Reform Movement 1993–
1996.56 Several government reviews of the construction industry had taken place during 
the post-war period.57 But in contrast to these earlier exercises, the impetus for the 
Latham Review came from within the construction industry itself. Adams and Pollington 
describe a growing realisation in the late 1980s among industry bodies that 
fundamental change was needed to deal with major shortcomings in both the industry’s 
relationship with the Government (its biggest client) and its internal structure and 
relationships. These bodies initiated discussions with senior political figures with a view 
to obtaining government support for a major review of the problems, and perhaps 
government leadership of the required changes.58  
 In 1992 the Government acceded to the growing industry demands and began to 
take active steps to prepare for a major review of the construction industry.59 But from 
the outset this was conceived as an industry-led project, with the Government playing a 
co-ordinating and facilitative role. Ministers and civil servants took active steps to 
encourage all sections of the industry to participate in the review, and to focus on their 
objectives for the industry as a whole, rather than on their narrow sectoral interests.60 
                                                             
55 The four funding bodies and their composition are set out in Sir Michael Latham, ‘Trust and 
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They also ensured that the review took a format which commanded industry support, 
and that the reviewer was an independent figure who was acceptable to all industry 
sectors, and to its clients.61 Sir Michael Latham, a recently retired MP, was ultimately 
chosen.  
 The terms of reference for the review, which were agreed after lengthy 
negotiations between representatives of the four funding bodies, effectively asked for an 
inquiry into the contractual environment in which the construction industry operated. 
But the objective was clearly focused on the need to improve trust and co-operation, 
together with productivity and competitiveness.62  
 The Latham Review was not a social scientific inquiry in the nature of the 
Cambridge Study, but its interim report, ‘Trust and Money’63 and final report, 
‘Constructing the Team’,64 provide a wealth of evidence of the state of the UK 
construction industry and the context in which it operated in the early 1990s, which can 
be cross-referenced with other sources.65 Latham worked with a team of assessors 
drawn from the four funding bodies and from two further bodies representing the 
construction industry’s clients.66 Over the course of the 12-month review he held 140 
formal meetings and interviews with interested parties from the industry and its clients, 
together with a small number of MPs and lawyers, supplemented by many further 
informal contacts by telephone and at industry functions.67 He also received letters from 
100 MPs on behalf of construction firms in their constituencies, and a large number of 
direct responses, following the publication of ‘Trust and Money’ in December 1993.68  
 Read in conjunction with contemporaneous sources, the two reports present a 
picture of a highly dysfunctional market with a pervasive lack of trust among 
participants.69 Two particular features stand out. The first is the lack of effective 
sanctions for breach of contract (whether legal or non-legal). The second is the absence 
of controls on the ability of parties at all levels of the industry to use whatever power 
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62 The Terms of Reference are set out in Latham, ‘Trust and Money’ (1993) 30. 
63 ibid. 
64 Sir M Latham, ‘Constructing the Team – Final Report of the Government / Industry Review of 
Procurement Arrangements in the UK Industry’ (London, HMSO, 1994). 
65 In particular, Latham’s findings are consistent with the findings of a contemporaneous socio-
legal study, J Flood and A Caiger, ‘Lawyers and Arbitration: the Juridification of Construction 
Disputes’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 412. 
66 These were the Chartered Institute of Purchase and Supply (CIPS) and the British Property 
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67 The formal meetings are listed in Latham, ‘Constructing the Team’ (1994) 116–19.  
68 ibid 2. 
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they had against weaker parties, and to act in ways which were damaging to the 
interests of the industry as a whole as well as those of its clients.  
B. Self-regulation through Standard Form Contracts  
Construction contracts are often referred to in general work on contract law in ways 
which overlook the dire straits in which the industry found itself at the time of the 
Latham Review, and the importance (or even the existence) of the legislative regulation 
which now underpins their operation. In particular, the longstanding existence of 
standard form contracts and subcontracts produced by industry bodies such as the Joint 
Contracts Tribunal (JCT) and Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) is sometimes taken to 
indicate that the construction industry is largely self-regulating.  
 These standard forms, drafted by bodies containing representatives from all 
sides of the industry, attempt to strike a fair balance of risk and interest between the 
different participants in a construction contract. In principle, therefore, they are a means 
of regulating inequality and a potential source of system trust. But in practice they have 
inherent limits as a form of regulation, particularly as compared to the General 
Conditions of Business found in Germany, which were considered in the Cambridge 
Study.70 Their primary limitation is that the legal and non-legal structures which ensure 
the wide use of the General Conditions of Business in Germany have no equivalent in the 
English contractual environment. As at 1993–94, Latham found that the standard forms 
were rarely used in an un-amended state,71 and were frequently rejected by larger firms 
who adopted their own standard terms and conditions of contract or subcontract, or 
clients who preferred a bespoke contract. 72  
 A second limitation is that the ability of the standard forms to meet the demands 
of the industry, particularly during times of change and in challenging market 
conditions, depends on the effectiveness of the drafting bodies and their internal 
structures and organisation. The Latham Review found that, as at 1993–94, the drafting 
bodies and the documentation which they had produced left much to be desired. They 
had been unable to produce standard forms of subcontract which were acceptable to 
both main contractors and subcontractors, leaving this important and contentious 
category of relationships outside of the industry’s regulatory mechanism.73 And they 
had not produced the more complex suites of contract documents which were needed to 
cope with a major change in the structure of the industry which had occurred over the 
preceding 30 years and intensified during the 1990–92 recession, namely, the vast 
increase in the proportion of on-site work which was carried out by subcontractors as 
opposed to workers employed directly by the main contractor.74 In many cases the 
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terms of the now numerous subcontracts on a construction project did not match the 
procedures and risk allocations assumed by the main contract, and contained important 
gaps, which in turn led to ‘confusion of responsibility, transfer of risk, adversarial 
attitudes and litigation’.75 
 These and other findings by the Latham Review suggest that the supra-
contractual governance structures identified by Collins as essential to the success of a 
modern construction project had not emerged as at 1993–94.76 Instead, construction 
projects were characterised by routinely dysfunctional relationships between the 
participants, whilst confidence in the traditional governance structures found in the 
standard forms had been undermined. 
C. Relationships between Main Contractors and Subcontractors 
Given the fragmented structure of the construction industry, subcontracting 
relationships were of particular importance for the success of a building project. The 
Latham Review found that, following financial pressures caused by the 1990–92 
recession, relationships between main contractors and subcontractors had substantially 
deteriorated. A major factor in this deterioration was the lack of effective legal or non-
legal sanctions available to subcontractors faced with breach of a payment obligation. 
Main contractors freely admitted during the Review that they had ensured financial 
survival in a difficult economic climate by engaging in ‘controversial dealings’ with 
subcontractors such as paying them late; making an ‘early payment’ discount to 
payments under the subcontract even when this had not been allowed for in the 
contract or where payment was made late instead of early; and disingenuously engaging 
them in prolonged arguments about the sums properly due for variations to the 
subcontract works.77 Flood and Caiger’s contemporaneous socio-legal study confirms 
that these practices were widespread, and points to a further form of ‘subbie bashing’, 
namely the practice of cynically delaying payment until the subcontractor was forced 
into bankruptcy, meaning in practice that its payment claim would no longer be 
pursued.78 Non-legal sanctions such as reputational damage appear to have been 
ineffective to deter these practices, and prevailing industry norms may even have 
encouraged them.79 
 In this situation one might expect that, as with the British industries considered 
in the Cambridge Study, legal sanctions would assume greater importance. But in the 
construction context, the legal process was a much less effective way of dealing with 
non-payment. The factual complexity of construction disputes meant that even in the 
specialist Official Referees’ courts, trials were long and expensive. The quicker and 
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cheaper summary judgment procedure was of little practical use to a subcontractor 
seeking to enforce its right to payment.80 The subcontractor’s straightforward claim in 
debt could easily be met by a defence of set-off based on allegations of delay or defects 
which were unsuitable for determination under this procedure, so that a full trial would 
be ordered, even though the allegations might be somewhat disingenuous.81 Arbitration 
was similarly unsatisfactory.82 Many subcontractors were small or even one-person 
firms,83 and in the absence of an effective legal or non-legal sanction to enforce their 
rights to payment, large numbers of them became insolvent.84 
 This can be seen as a situation in which procedural law, rather than the 
substantive law of contract itself, was unsuited to the needs of construction contracts. 
The consequences were significant: even the minimum level of system trust which is 
normally provided by the availability of legal sanctions was lacking in relations between 
main contractors and subcontractors. Main contractors acknowledged that the general 
atmosphere of distrust caused by the prevalence of abusive payment practices was 
having a negative impact on the performance of subcontractors.85 As subcontractors 
were now carrying out the majority of the work on site, this had in turn affected the 
quality of the service which main contractors were able to provide to their clients.86 But 
main contractors had been unable, collectively or individually, to resolve these 
problems. 
 In addition to the need for effective sanctions, the Review found that a lack of 
more general regulation of the inequality between main contractors and subcontractors 
was contributing to the distrust and resentment. Fragmentation of the industry, 
combined with significant excess capacity and low entry barriers at all levels, had 
greatly increased the bargaining power of main contractors when negotiating 
subcontracts. In addition to the payment abuses referred to above, main contractors 
were able to impose onerous terms on their subcontractors including terms which cut 
down their rights to payment in the first place.87 A particular source of antagonism was 
‘pay-when-paid’ clauses, which made the obligation to pay the subcontractor contingent 
on the paying party’s receipt of funds from the client or another third party. This made it 
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difficult for the subcontractor to know whether and if so when its right to payment had 
accrued, undermining its ability to assert or enforce its payment rights and hindering 
financial planning. It also placed the risk of wrongful non-payment by the client, or client 
insolvency, on the subcontractor. Given the long chains of subcontracts and sub-
subcontracts which now existed on large construction projects, pay-when-paid clauses 
were a significant source distrust and instability. 
D. Relations between Clients and Main Contractors 
Although the construction industry has a longstanding adversarial culture, it seems 
likely that the heightened difficulties identified above were caused by the reaction of 
main contractors to the 1990–92 recession, which had resulted in ‘substantial excess 
capacity and too many firms chasing too little work’.88 Main contractors began to 
compete aggressively on price, and a ‘low bid, high claim’ culture developed in which 
tenders were routinely submitted at unrealistically low sums, on the basis that some 
flaw in the drawings or specification had been identified which could in due course be 
used to claim additional monies under terms in the standard forms which were 
designed to provide flexibility in unforeseen circumstances.89 If the strategy failed, the 
main contractor would make a loss on the project, in which case there was a significant 
risk of its becoming insolvent. If it succeeded, the cost to of the project would increase 
significantly from the original tender. Unsurprisingly, the increased risks of main 
contractor insolvency and unexpected cost increases led to distrust and dissatisfaction 
on the part of clients.90 
 Clients were also justifiably concerned about quality.91 The practice of under-
bidding and dysfunctional relations with subcontractors seem likely to have contributed 
to these problems. However, in line with the findings of the Cambridge Study, the 
Review identified a piecemeal and tentative approach to the regulation of quality in 
construction through the use of voluntaristic quality management processes, rather than 
the technical standards found in countries such as Germany. Latham expressed doubt as 
to whether the recently introduced quality assurance system would have an impact on 
site activities,92 and noted that the absence of any entry barriers to becoming a main 
contracting firm in terms of training, accreditation or capital had led to the presence of 
incompetent firms whose existence posed a threat to responsible firms even if market 
forces would, in the end, drive them out of business.93 This can be seen as another 
example of the UK construction market’s lack of non-legal mechanisms creating system 
trust, so that the burden of creating trust in relation to quality fell entirely on the 
arrangements within individual contracts.  
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 At the level of individual contracts, the Review found that clients were using 
their superior bargaining power to impose onerous contract terms on main contractors 
in the hope of gaining greater protection against these risks. To reduce the prospect of 
cost increases, the standard forms were rejected in favour of a bespoke contract, or 
amended to alter the balance of risk in the client’s favour.94 Insolvency risk was 
countered by extending the payment periods set by the standard forms, and by 
requiring main contractors to provide performance bonds, often in an ‘on demand’ 
format, which imposed a significant burden on their finances.95 Following the decision in 
Murphy v Brentwood District Council,96 which effectively removed clients’ ability to sue 
in negligence in respect of latent defects, it became common to require broad collateral 
warranties from numerous participants in a construction project, some of which were 
impossible to insure and would be likely to result in insolvency if enforcement was 
sought.97 Subcontractors in particular complained that they were being required to 
assume responsibility for work over which they had no practical control.98 Litigation 
over latent defects was complex and costly: the fragmented nature of the construction 
process meant that defects were often the result of complex combinations of acts or 
omissions by numerous different firms and individuals, so that trials would involve 
difficult technical issues, expert evidence and multiple parties.99 
E. Governance Structures and the Role of Construction Professionals 
A third factor identified in the Latham Review as undermining trust and co-operation 
was that the governance structure relied on in traditional construction contracts, 
including the standard forms, was proving inadequate in a changed contractual 
environment. In a traditional construction contract, the client obtains a complete design 
for the works from a design professional which is then executed by the main contractor 
under the supervision of an architect or engineer who is engaged by the client to act as 
the contract administrator.100 The contract administrator plays a crucial role in the 
operation of a number of clauses which are used in the standard forms to provide the 
flexibility needed in a complex, long-term construction project. In carrying out this role, 
he or she owes a professional duty to act impartially as between the client and the main 
contractor, despite having been engaged by the client and acting for many other 
purposes as the client’s agent.  
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 The prime example of these sophisticated and important clauses is a variations 
clause, which provides that additional work not shown in the contract drawings or 
specification may be instructed, valued and paid for during the course of the project 
under a contractual procedure. Typically, variations clauses also have the effect that 
practical difficulties or restrictions on site, or discrepancies in the drawings or 
specification, which would otherwise place the client in breach of contract, are instead 
identified and compensated for as variations.101 The existence or otherwise of a true 
variation, and the payment which is properly due if a variation does exist, are 
determined by the contract administrator acting as a neutral arbiter between the 
interests of the client and the main contractor. Other examples are ‘extension of time’ 
and ‘loss and expense’ clauses, which allocate the risk of particular events which might 
delay the agreed completion date or increase costs in an unanticipated way. These 
clauses again set out procedures under which the causes of delay and the contractor’s 
entitlement to additional time for completion and / or reimbursement of additional 
costs are determined by the contract administrator acting impartially.102  
 Given the ‘low bid, high claim’ culture and the general atmosphere of distrust 
noted above, the proper operation of these clauses assumed a critical importance. 
However, the Latham Review found that changes in the way architects and engineers 
were selected and paid, and pressure from clients to ensure that the costs of a project 
did not increase beyond expectations, had led them to approach their duties in a more 
defensive and adversarial way. This had called into question their ability to achieve the 
impartiality and even-handedness envisaged by the standard forms.103 It was also noted 
that contract administration on many projects was now carried out by a project 
manager who might not be subject to the same professional or legal duties as an 
architect or engineer in any event.104 Although the standard forms allowed a contract 
administrator’s decision to be challenged by arbitration or litigation, both were slow 
and expensive105 and could often be pursued only at the end of the construction project. 
Main contractors and subcontractors argued that a further tier of governance structure 
was needed so that decisions and certificates issued by contract administrators could be 
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reviewed by an independent third party during the course of the works.106 But although 
support was growing across the industry and its clients for the introduction of a speedy, 
independent dispute resolution procedure which could be used during the course of a 
construction project, architects in particular opposed it, and no concrete action had 
been taken to introduce such a mechanism into the main standard forms.107 
 These findings in the Latham Review support the argument that both the 
availability of sanctions and the regulation of inequality are important in facilitating the 
creation of trusting and co-operative relationships, whether provided by legal or non-
legal means. They also provide a concrete example of a context in which commercial 
actors and trade bodies were unable to create the regulation and sanctions which were 
needed to support their activities, and where the failure of the legal system to fill this 
gap led to a collapse of trust and co-operation. The Review’s recommendations, 
discussed below, show how the reform of contract law as it relates to specific contract 
types can provide a way to address such difficulties.  
V. ‘Constructing the Team’ – Recommendations and 
Implementation 
The final report of the Latham Review, ‘Constructing the Team’, was published in July 
1994. The recommendations it contained were not the product of negotiation and 
compromise between the industry and client bodies who had participated in the review. 
Instead, ‘Constructing the Team’ was presented as ‘the personal Report of an 
independent, but friendly, observer’ 108 who had sought to produce ‘a balanced 
package’109 of recommendations which he hoped they would adopt. Many of the 
recommendations had nothing directly to do with law. However, legislation was 
proposed in two key areas. First, Latham advised that a ‘legislative underpinning’ was 
needed to support a wider reform of the industry’s approach to contract drafting which 
was, in his view, the key to improving trust and co-operation. The core of this legislative 
underpinning was supported by industry and client bodies and was ultimately enacted 
in the HGCRA. As explained below, the content of the proposals supports this chapter’s 
argument as to the importance of sanctions and regulation of inequality in supporting 
trust and co-operation in commercial relations, and the ability of law to provide these 
things where non-legal sources do not. It is also important to note the reflexive way in 
which they were intended to work. 
 The second proposal for legal reform sought to address the lack of trust between 
clients and main contractors in relation to quality, and to reduce the amount of litigation 
generated by latent defects, using a more substantive and less flexible technique. This 
involved the introduction of compulsory first-party insurance against defects, and far-
reaching changes to the law of limitation and joint and several liability as they applied to 
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claims arising from construction projects. These proposals were not enacted: they 
commanded insufficient support among industry and client bodies, and faced significant 
opposition from the Law Commissions and other legal groups. By considering them, 
however, we can perhaps learn something about the limits of using legal reform to 
regulate commercial activity.  
A. A Legislative Underpinning for the Reform of Contracting Practice  
A major objective of the Latham Review had been to identify measures which would 
improve relationships between participants in construction projects, reducing conflict 
and litigation and increasing trust and co-operation. Recognising the importance of the 
contractual framework in the construction context, Latham’s proposed solution to this 
problem was that the industry and its clients should rethink their approach to contract 
drafting and in particular move away from central elements of the traditional mode of 
construction contracting found in the standard forms. In itself this was a soft proposal, 
aimed primarily at the drafting bodies which produced the standard forms. However, 
given the inherent limitations of the standard forms as a means of regulation, Latham 
recommended that key elements of his proposed changes should be underpinned by 
legislation so that they could not be avoided by parties using their freedom of contract 
to either amend the standard form they were using, or to use their own bespoke 
contract.  
 As noted above, traditional construction contracts such as the standard forms 
use sophisticated drafting techniques to provide the flexibility needed in construction 
projects. Variations clauses, extension of time clauses and loss and expense clauses seek 
to manage the tension and conflict arising from the inherent uncertainty of construction 
operations110 by displacing the rules of classical contract doctrine, and in particular the 
unrealistic assumption of complete presentiation.111 A variations clause allows the 
contractually agreed scope of work or the conditions on which the contractor has access 
to the site to be modified after formation of the contract; an extension of time clause 
allows the contractually agreed completion date to be extended in the light of 
unforeseen circumstances; and a loss and expense clause allows the contractor to be 
reimbursed for unanticipated costs. However, these clauses allocate risk at the point of 
contract formation, and thus come as close to presentiation as possible. Extension of 
time clauses identify specific events which will trigger an entitlement to an extension of 
time for completion, placing the risk of delay caused by any other events on the 
contractor. Loss and expense clauses similarly tie the contractor’s entitlement to 
reimbursement to specific events or circumstances. Variations clauses leave the risk of 
unanticipated costs which do not involve a departure from the original contract 
documents with the contractor. In a traditional building contract the conflict which 
ensues when the risk of unanticipated delay or cost materialises is managed by 
requiring the contract administrator, acting impartially, to determine how the relevant 
clause applies to the facts which have arisen, following a contractually mandated 
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procedure. But the presence of conflict in the contractual relationship is taken for 
granted and perhaps even encouraged by the way in which these procedures are 
framed.  
 Latham suggested that the standard forms should be fundamentally changed so 
that they approximated more closely to the approach found in the (then) recently 
published New Engineering Contract (NEC). The NEC was drafted on behalf of the ICE by 
a project management consultant and seeks to operate primarily as a detailed 
management system for the process of completing a construction project rather than as 
a statement of the parties’ legal rights and obligations. Its integrated suite of contract 
and subcontract documentation is structured so as to incentivise team work and co-
operation, in particular by requiring the early identification of potential problems 
during the works and by adopting a starting presumption that the solution to any 
problems so identified will be developed in a way that brings advantages to all those 
affected.112 Risks are allocated, but the aim is to channel the parties’ behaviour by 
mandating co-operative processes in which they must agree a mutually beneficial way 
forward when a risk materialises. This contrasts with the processes found in traditional 
construction contracts which simply provide a forum within which conflict over the 
consequences of a risk materialising can take place. A further difference is that the NEC 
contract documentation prompts the parties to make their own risk allocation for the 
particular project, whereas the traditional standard forms contain a risk allocation set 
by the drafting body which is designed to remain unaltered.  
 Latham advised that adopting this more relational approach in the contractual 
documents themselves, together with an express duty ‘for all parties to deal fairly with 
each other, and with their subcontractors, specialists and suppliers, in an atmosphere of 
mutual co-operation’,113 would improve trust and co-operation. But his 
recommendations for legal reform recognised the importance of sanctions and the 
regulation of inequality in making such a relational approach work.  
 Regarding sanctions, Latham recommended that the revised standard forms 
should, like the NEC, provide for the speedy determination of disputes under the main 
contract or any subcontracts by an impartial adjudicator114 and should oblige the parties 
to comply with the adjudicator’s decision immediately, albeit there would be the 
possibility of an appeal after practical completion of the project.115 This was the first 
element of the proposed reform that Latham advised should be given a legislative 
underpinning. All construction contracts would be legally required to provide a right to 
refer disputes to adjudication. 
 As conceived by Latham, adjudication can be characterised as a hybrid sanction, 
containing both legal and non-legal elements. The adjudicator would determine the 
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parties’ legal rights and obligations under the contract, similarly to an arbitrator, 
although like an arbitrator he need not be a lawyer or follow legalistic procedures. 
However, Latham envisaged the courts would play an important supporting role by 
enforcing the adjudicator’s decision, ideally using ‘an expedited procedure’ such as 
summary judgment, in any cases where the losing party refused to comply 
immediately.116 The enforcement proceedings would thus take the form of an action for 
breach of contract in failing to implement the adjudicator’s decision, but would not 
involve a full trial.  
 Latham was clear that adjudication should be available in respect of any dispute 
arising under a contract or subcontract, providing the additional governance structure 
which was needed to restore confidence in the proper operation of variations and other 
clauses. 117 However, adjudication’s primary function would be to curb the payment 
abuses which he had identified as the root of the dysfunctional relationships between 
main contractors and subcontractors. To ensure that it would be effective in performing 
this task, Latham further recommended that the payment procedures in construction 
contracts should made more transparent, with these changes similarly underpinned by 
legislation. The legislation would require all construction contracts to clearly set out the 
period within which interim payments to all participants would fall due.118 Construction 
contracts would also be required to prohibit the paying party from making a deduction 
or set-off against payments due under the contract without giving notice in advance, 
specifying the reason for the deduction and its amount.119 This would ensure that the 
validity of any deduction or set-off could be made the subject of an adjudication, whilst if 
the paying party failed to give notice, the payment would become due in full.  
 The availability of a quick and effective sanction for breach of contract would 
itself alter the balance of power between the parties to a construction contract during 
the course of the works. However, Latham also recommended that pay-when-paid 
clauses should be removed from the standard form subcontracts, and should also be 
rendered legally invalid, along with cross-contractual set-off clauses.120 These more 
substantive measures would regulate inequality by removing the ability of powerful 
parties to impose these onerous terms. But although subcontractors clearly saw these 
clauses as unfair, Latham’s rationale for prohibiting them was not ‘unfairness’ in itself. It 
was rather the impact which such clauses had in fuelling the distrust between main 
contractors and subcontractors. 
 Latham’s final recommendation for legislation to underpin the reform of 
construction contracts was designed to deal with the impact on trust of the high levels of 
insolvency in the construction industry, which combined with the long chains of 
contracts and subcontracts found on construction projects created a high risk that firms 
would not be paid for work they had carried out. The rules of property law meant that 
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retention of title clauses, used in other spheres of commerce to protect against this risk, 
were ineffective in the construction context. The materials supplied by a construction 
contractor become the property of the landowner once incorporated into the building. 
Latham noted that this issue had been addressed in North America and Germany by 
creating a statutory ‘builder’s lien’ over the works, but considered that payment via a 
trust fund would be more effective in the English context.121 He proposed that 
construction contracts should be required by law to provide for payments to the main 
contractor to be made via a trust fund. Changes would be made to insolvency law so that 
subcontractors could be paid directly from the trust fund, bypassing an insolvent main 
contractor’s secured or unsecured creditors.122  
 The proposed legislative underpinning for Latham’s otherwise soft 
recommendations to the industry can be seen as intended to enhance trust and co-
operation within individual transactions, and to create system trust in the market as a 
whole. In the light of Latham’s findings on the dysfunctional relationships between main 
contractors and subcontractors in particular, it seems likely that the co-operative 
attitudes he hoped to engender could only be established in individual transactions if 
both parties understood that the payment and other terms which they had negotiated 
could be legally enforced if necessary. The proposals can be seen as intended to provide 
a set of basic parameters within which the negotiation of individual contracts could take 
place. Concerns as to the transparency of payment obligations, the existence of a 
meaningful sanction for non-payment, and the proper operation of variations and other 
clauses would be resolved at the system level rather than becoming an immediate 
concern for parties negotiating an individual transaction.  
 The legislative underpinning would also regulate inequality between the parties 
involved in a construction project by curbing the ability of more powerful parties to act 
in ways which the Review had found were damaging to trust and co-operation and to 
the wider interests of the industry as a whole. The Cambridge Study found that German 
trade associations performed this function using non-legal techniques such as the 
formulation of General Conditions of Business and recommendations which were de 
facto binding on the contracting practices of whole industries. Latham was in effect 
proposing that, where an industry consensus existed, this function could instead be 
performed by legislation which modified the general law of contract.  
B. Compulsory Latent Defects Insurance and Reform of the Law of Joint 
and Several Liability and Limitation Periods 
Latham’s proposed solution to the dissatisfaction surrounding latent defects was more 
radical, and sought to regulate inequality in more substantive and less flexible way. The 
root of the problem was identified as the ability of clients, who were justifiably 
concerned about the risk of latent defects, to use their superior bargaining power to 
extract extensive and often uninsurable collateral warranties from the different 
participants involved in delivering a construction project. As noted above, the 
fragmentation and complexity of the construction process meant that attempts to 
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enforce collateral warranties often resulted in lengthy and costly multi-party litigation, 
and the insolvency of some defendants or potential defendants. Clients were 
dissatisfied, whilst those in the industry felt that the rule of joint and several liability, 
which enabled clients to recover the whole of their loss against any one of the parties 
who was legally responsible for it, irrespective of their degree of culpability as 
compared to the other parties involved, was unfair.  
 Latham’s proposed solution to these issues was to remove important aspects of 
liability for latent defects from the bargaining process altogether. Building on the 
recommendations of a working party set up by the Department of the Environment 
(DOE) comprising client and industry representatives, Latham recommended a package 
of reforms which, if implemented, would have had the legal effect of removing the 
construction industry from the general law of joint and several liability and limitation, 
and the practical effect of removing the majority of disputes arising from latent defects 
from the private law system.  
 The practical removal of latent defects claims from the private law system would 
be achieved by introducing a legislative requirement for all new commercial, retail and 
industrial building projects123 to take out compulsory first-party material damage 
insurance to cover the cost of rectifying latent defects for 10 years from the date of 
practical completion of the project.124 The legislation would require the cost of the 
policy to be shared between the principal participants in the construction project 
(clients, professional consultants and main contractors – who may in turn pass part of 
the cost on to subcontractors). Importantly, from the point of view of reducing litigation, 
the legislation would also require the policy to exclude subrogation. 
 Given the ability to recover rectification costs by way of an insurance claim, it 
may have been expected that clients and their successors in title would be less likely in 
practice to pursue litigation in respect of defects.125 However, Latham made three 
further recommendations which would radically change the nature of any litigation 
which did take place. These had been formulated, although not unanimously adopted, by 
the DOE working party. The first recommendation was that the legislation should be 
enacted to abolish joint and several liability for claims arising from construction defects, 
and replace it with a rule that defendants should be liable for a fair proportion of the 
claimant’s loss, having regard to their relative degree of blame.126 The second was that 
legislation should introduce a single limitation period for latent defects claims arising 
from new construction projects, whether arising in contract or tort, of 10 years from the 
date of practical completion of the project.127 And finally, it was recommended that the 
client’s right to recover contractual damages in respect of the cost of rectifying defects in 
the building should be transferred automatically to subsequent owners of the building, 
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including tenants with a full repairing lease.128 The legislation would prevent parties 
from contracting out of these rules. 
 These proposals went much further than the proposed legislative underpinning 
for construction contracts reform. Rather than imposing procedural requirements on 
the private regulation created by the parties to construction projects in their contracts, 
they mandated specific outcomes, fixing the content of substantive private law rights 
and obligations. The underlying rationale of these proposals also went further than the 
proposals for construction contracts reform: the aim was, in part, to improve 
substantive fairness for its own sake, as well as to clarify the law and discourage 
litigation. 
C. Implementation (and Non-implementation)  
Part II of the HGCRA, which received Royal Assent on 24 July 1996, substantially 
adopted the two main elements of Latham’s recommended legislative underpinning for 
construction contracts reform. By s 108, construction contracts relating to work to be 
carried out in England, Wales or Scotland129 are required to provide a right for any party 
to refer disputes to an impartial adjudicator, who must decide the dispute within 28 
days or such longer period as the parties may agree after the dispute has been 
referred.130 The contract must further provide that the adjudicator’s decision is binding 
until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, arbitration or agreement.131 
Sections 109–10 impose procedural requirements on the payment mechanisms in a 
construction contract which seek to ensure that the dates on which payments fall due 
are clear, and that any dispute over the amount properly due will be the subject of 
written notices given in advance of the due date and therefore readily amenable to the 
adjudication process.132 In the event that the contract does not meet the statutory 
requirements in relation to adjudication or payment, a set of default terms found in the 
Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998133 (‘The 
Scheme’) are read into the contract as necessary and take effect as implied terms. The 
second element of Latham’s proposed legislative underpinning, which sought to regulate 
inequality in subcontracting relations by invalidating pay-when-paid clauses, is adopted 
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in s 113 (subject to an exception for third-party insolvency) and is supplemented by the 
creation of a statutory right to suspend work for non-payment in s 112.134  
 The legislative proposals in relation to payment via trust funds, and the package 
of proposals designed to deal with liability for latent defects, did not appear in the Bill 
which ultimately became the HGCRA.135 The reason they were abandoned appears to be 
that, in contrast to the matters which did appear in the Bill, the necessary consensus 
among the industry and its clients was lacking136 although, as explained below, they 
were also strongly opposed by the English and Scottish Law Commissions and other 
legal groups. It seems possible that their more rigid and substantive regulatory 
approach may have contributed to their failure to gain greater support. The proposals 
on latent defects in particular sought to create a modified regime of private law rights 
and obligations for the construction industry and to impose it in a way that left little 
scope for flexibility and choice at the level of individual contracts.  
VI. A New Kind of Regulation 
A. The Challenges of Regulating Commercial Contracts 
Whilst the legislative regulation of commercial contracts by statutes such as the HGCRA 
has been overlooked by contract scholars, the difficulties posed by any attempt to 
regulate commercial activity are well recognised. Morgan, for example, characterises 
commercial contract law as ‘radically optional’,137 pointing out that sophisticated 
commercial parties will seek to evade undesirable rules, and are ultimately free to opt 
out of the whole legal system, including its mandatory rules, using choice of law, or by 
exiting the legal system altogether in favour of arbitration or extra-legal enforcement.138 
Campbell draws our attention to the capacity of economic actors to respond reflexively 
to changes in their legal environment, adapting their behaviour in ways which are likely 
to frustrate any regulation that assumes they will simply follow (or disobey) a rule.139 
There is also the risk of regulatory backfiring – regulation may do more harm than good, 
for example by stifling innovation or undermining desirable features of the commercial 
activity being regulated. The suggestion that the legal imposition of relational norms 
such as trust and co-operation will crowd out genuine trust and co-operation is one 
version of this argument.  
 Another difficulty is that legal measures designed to regulate inequality between 
commercial contracting parties may come into conflict with fundamental principles of 
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contract law. Regulation which directly affects the content of a contract will conflict with 
the principle of freedom of contract, whilst regulation which applies only to particular 
economic sectors undermines the classical idea that private law consists of a set of 
generally applicable and rationally coherent rules and principles.140 
 Teubner conceptualises these difficulties as the regulatory trilemma: the tension 
between the risk that legal regulation will have no impact on the practice being 
regulated at all; the risk of ‘over-legalizing’ the regulated practice and thereby changing 
it in undesirable ways; and the risk that by engaging in the task of regulation, law will 
become ‘over-socialized’ and will lose its distinctiveness and coherence.141 These 
different ways in which regulation can fail mean that simple command-and-control or 
substantive regulatory techniques, which operate directly by mandating specific 
standards or outcomes, should be avoided. However, this does not mean law cannot 
perform any regulatory function beyond acting as an external guarantor of private 
ordering. Rather, Teubner argues that challenges posed by the regulatory trilemma can 
be tackled using reflexive law. 
 Reflexive law is procedurally orientated. It seeks to improve the quality of 
outcomes within the regulated activity using procedural techniques, rather than 
mandating specific outcomes or standards.142 In contractual contexts, reflexive law 
might seek to structure the bargaining process from which contracts emerge, but having 
set these structural premises would leave the parties free to determine the substance of 
their obligations. The general law of contract as we have it is reflexive in this way, 
setting the boundaries of acceptable bargaining practices via doctrines such as 
misrepresentation, duress and undue influence, but declining for the most part to 
concern itself with the substance of what is agreed.143 But reflexive law differs from the 
formal rationality found in classical contract law in that it does not take existing 
distributions as given.144 The common law doctrines which regulate the bargaining 
process take a formal approach in so far as they aim to promote autonomy and choice 
without impacting the relative strength of the parties’ bargaining positions. A reflexive 
approach might go further, structuring the bargaining process in ways which are 
intended to equalise the parties’ bargaining power in order to influence the quality, 
although not the substance, of the outcome. Importantly, however, this strategy would 
only be pursued if it seemed likely to achieve the broader aims of the regulatory 
exercise. In a reflexive approach, the equalisation of power is a means to an end, not a 
normative end in itself.145 
B. Responsive Reflexivity 
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Taken individually, the provisions of the HGCRA seem to incorporate both substantive 
and reflexive elements. The primary approach is reflexive: the requirement in s 108 for 
construction contracts to provide for adjudication, and the requirements in relation to 
payment in s 109–11, impose procedures rather than substantive outcomes. Moreover, 
the mechanism employed by these sections differs from the traditional approach found 
in statutes such as the Sale of Goods Act 1979 of imposing mandatory or default implied 
terms. They leave the parties free to devise their own terms in order to meet statutory 
requirements, providing flexibility and mitigating the incursion on freedom of contract. 
The model terms contained in the Scheme are implied into the contract only where the 
parties fail to take this opportunity.146  
 The right to suspend work for non-payment in s 112 and the prohibition on pay-
when-paid clauses in s 113 appear on their face to be more substantive. However, in the 
light of the Latham Review, they can be seen as measures intended to adjust the balance 
of power between the parties to a construction contract not as a normative end in itself, 
but as a means of enhancing trust and co-operation. Overall, then, the HGCRA could be 
seen as an example of reflexive law.  
 However, thinking of the HGCRA in this way overlooks what are arguably its 
most theoretically interesting features. The first of these is the extent to which this 
statute, given its origins and content, can be seen as a joint exercise in which the 
Government, the industry and its clients, and ultimately the courts, participated in the 
development and implementation of the regulation which it contains. These features go 
beyond Teubner’s concept of reflexive law, which assumes a clear separation of function 
between law as the regulating system, and the practice which is the object of regulation. 
Reflexivity does not capture the extent to which, as the HGCRA demonstrates, legal 
regulation can be product of collaborative interaction between the activities of the 
regulated industry, the legislature and the courts. The second is the fact that legal 
regulation like the HGCRA responds to the specific needs and features of particular 
markets or contexts. This has important theoretical implications for the third part of the 
regulatory trilemma, the danger that law will lose its distinctiveness and internal 
coherence. 
 We can deal with these features more effectively if we look beyond legal-centric 
theories. Ayres and Braithwaite’s theory of responsive regulation is of particular 
assistance.147 Addressing the broad question of how to improve the quality of 
government policy solutions, Ayres and Braithwaite argue that governments should 
seek to understand the interplay between private and public regulation in any sphere 
they wish to regulate, and to ‘steer the mix of private and public regulation’148 in order 
to achieve their policy goals. Responsive regulation or ‘thinking responsively’149 is 
proposed as the optimal way to do this. The core idea is that regulation should be 
grounded in a thorough understanding of the regulated industry. It should respond to 
the industry’s structure, including the differing motivations of firms, and to its conduct, 
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including the effectiveness of its own private regulation.150 But thinking responsively 
also entails an innovative and flexible approach to choosing a regulatory response, using 
this contextual knowledge.151 For example, a responsive regulator might delegate part of 
the regulatory function to the regulated firms themselves, via co-regulation (where the 
state provides oversight or ratification of regulation produced by an industry 
association)152 or enforced self-regulation (where the state requires individual firms to 
set their own regulatory standards, failing which more onerous default standards are 
imposed).153 In common with Nonet and Selznick’s concept of responsive law,154 a 
responsive approach to regulation would thus involve a more context-specific approach 
to the formulation of legal rules, and a widening of opportunities to participate in 
determining their content.155 
 Drawing on these ideas, we can achieve a more comprehensive theoretical 
understanding of the HGCRA if we understand it as exhibiting responsive reflexivity. Its 
reflexive provisions were adopted as part of a highly responsive regulatory exercise. 
Most obviously, the Latham Review provided the thorough understanding of the 
regulated industry which responsive regulation demands. However, events after the 
Review demonstrate how a responsive approach to formulating regulation can involve 
close, iterative communication between the institutions of state and the participants in 
the regulated market. Of particular note is the way in which the provisions of the 
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Bill156 were drafted in close 
consultation with the industry and client bodies which had participated in the Review. 
This was facilitated by the creation of an Implementation Forum chaired by Latham 
himself,157 and subsequently the Construction Industry Board, whose express purpose 
was to provide a channel for industry and client comment on the Bill’s provisions as 
they were being drafted.158 The views expressed via this channel, as well as through 
responses to the DOE’s consultation paper on the legislative proposals,159 had an 
important impact on the Bill’s content. In particular, the DOE appears initially to have 
rejected Latham’s proposed ‘legislative underpinning’ for construction contracts reform, 
proposing instead a different regulatory mechanism which involved less direct 
interference with freedom of contract.160 However, this was abandoned in the face of 
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antipathy expressed by members of the construction industry who preferred Latham’s 
scheme.161  
 The responsive reflexivity of the HGCRA can also be seen from the way in which 
the Government appears to have seen its role as facilitating the creation of an industry 
consensus, recognising that this industry was unable to reach consensus unaided and 
needed support to regulate itself.162 The provisions of the HGCRA were designed to 
facilitate the improved operation of the industry’s own self-regulation through the 
standard forms, and the private regulation contained in individual construction 
contracts, in ways that were specifically tailored to the construction industry context. 
 Responsive reflexivity can also help to explain what is arguably the HGCRA’s 
most striking feature. This is the Act’s failure to specify the procedure by which an 
adjudicator’s award is to be enforced, or the grounds on which enforcement may be 
resisted, reflecting Latham’s view that these were matters for the courts.163 As noted 
above, the HGCRA states that a contract to which it applies must provide that the 
adjudicator’s decision is binding until the dispute is finally determined by litigation, 
arbitration or agreement.164 But the Act is silent as to what should happen if the decision 
is not voluntarily complied with. It appears to have been assumed that the courts could 
be relied on to devise the enforcement procedures and principles which would be 
needed to ensure the effective operation of the adjudication system,165 albeit the need 
for careful post-legislative scrutiny was acknowledged from the outset.166 Despite the 
lack of formal consultation with the judiciary prior to its enactment, the HGCRA 
required the courts to create new law in order to complete its regulatory framework.  
 From a legal perspective this looks like surprising delegation of power and 
responsibility to the courts, particularly given the contrasting approach taken in the 
Arbitration Act 1996, which received Royal Assent shortly before the HGCRA.167 But it 
can be understood in terms of responsive reflexivity. Unlike the Arbitration Act, the 
HGCRA applies to a narrow and carefully defined category of contracts168 and responds 
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to particular features of the context in which those contracts operate. One important 
feature of that context is the longstanding existence of a respected specialist judiciary. 
Moreover, the HGCRA can be seen as an example of what Collins has identified as ‘meta-
regulation’, which seeks to regulate the law of contract itself.169 Its regulatory technique 
is to steer and modify the operation of contract law by regulating the terms of 
construction contracts. Against this background, the decision to make the courts 
responsible for determining the rules and procedures governing adjudication 
enforcement can be seen as a way of providing responsive reflexivity in the HGCRA’s 
meta-regulatory exercise. The minimal requirements of s 108 gave the courts an 
important measure of freedom in deciding how to integrate adjudication into the law of 
contract.  
C. Responsive Reflexivity and the Regulatory Trilemma  
The responsive aspects of the HGCRA address the first two aspects of Teubner’s 
regulatory trilemma: the risk that legal regulation will have no impact on the regulated 
practice, and the risk that it will have an undesirable or unanticipated impact. The close 
involvement of the construction industry and its clients in the creation of this statute 
reduced these risks to the maximum possible extent and resulted in a statute which was 
tailored to their specific needs.170 However, these same elements serve to increase 
pressure on the trilemma’s third element, the risk that law will lose the distinctiveness 
and coherence of its own internal discourse. In particular, responsiveness poses an 
inherent challenge to the idea of contract law, and private law more broadly, as a set of 
generally applicable and formally coherent rules and principles.  
 The most visible manifestation of this tension in the events leading to the 
enactment of the HGCRA occurred in relation to Latham’s proposals to reform the law of 
joint and several liability and limitation for construction defects which, as noted above, 
did not find their way into the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Bill due 
to a lack of consensus among the industry and its clients. The DOE’s consultation 
exercise on these proposals171 revealed considerable opposition from the English and 
Scottish Law Commissions, and the legal profession more generally. Although the 
proposals involved significant interference with freedom of contract, being less reflexive 
than the proposals on construction contracts reform, the focus of objection was their 
interference with the generality of the rules of private law. From the perspective of legal 
discourse, the proposal to modify the rules of private law so extensively in their 
application to one particular industry was considered somewhat shocking, as well as 
undesirable as a matter of principle and policy.172 The consultation responses received 
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from the Law Commissions,173 the Lord Chancellor’s Department,174 academic lawyers175 
and the legal profession more generally176 were also sceptical as to whether 
modifications to these general rules in the case of the construction industry were 
justified, and felt that any reforms should be the subject of a Law Commission Review 
before being pursued any further. In Teubner’s terminology, this can be seen as 
reflecting a concern to protect the integrity of legal discourse. 
 The proposals which were included in the Bill, and ultimately the HGCRA itself, 
attracted less opposition from the Law Commissions and other legal groups, although 
this may in part have been because they were not fully consulted upon.177 Nonetheless 
the regulation of particular contract types, despite being relatively common in English 
law, poses a similar challenge to ideas of generality and coherence. The findings of the 
Latham Review demonstrate that, when considering the importance of this challenge, 
the rest of the regulatory trilemma remains in play. If the general rules of contract law 
are insufficiently responsive to the needs of a particular area of commercial activity, 
they may have little or no impact in that area. This can undermine the creation of trust 
and co-operation in commercial contexts like the UK construction industry, which rely 
on legal sanctions and regulation. Where generality and coherence have a practical cost, 
this should be squarely acknowledged and properly addressed. 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to highlight a blind spot in commercial contract scholarship, 
consisting in a failure to fully recognise that inequality can exist in commercial contexts, 
and that where it exists it can be a barrier to the creation of trust and co-operation if it is 
not regulated. The regulation of inequality can take many forms. It might consist in the 
existence of standard terms or payment practices whose use is de facto obligatory for 
participants in a given industry, restricting the ability of more powerful firms to bargain 
for different terms or practices which would disadvantage weaker contacting parties.178 
It might consist in the creation through trade rules of a dispute resolution mechanism 
which allows payment disputes to be resolved quickly and cheaply, addressing the 
problem that ‘when a little guy [merchant] isn’t paid, he may suffer huge financial 
harm’.179 Or it might consist in less formal norms which mean certain types of conduct 
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176 Department of Environment, ‘News Release – Responses to Consultation Paper on Latent 
Defects Liability and ‘BUILD’ insurance’ (19 July 1995).  
177 As noted above, the DOE’s only consultation paper on construction contracts reform set out 
proposals which were very different from those which were ultimately adopted in the Bill. 
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will result in reputational damage and a consequent loss of business.180 In different 
contexts, inequality may be regulated by a combination of some or all of these 
techniques. But in some contexts, like the UK manufacturer–supplier relationships 
considered in the Cambridge Study or the UK construction market at the time of the 
Latham Review, the main source of regulation is contract law. The Latham Review’s 
findings show how real difficulties can ensue if contract law does not perform this 
crucial regulatory function in a way which meets the needs of a particular commercial 
market. 
 The chapter has argued that contract scholars should pay more attention to 
markets where contract law performs this regulatory role, and in particular those 
markets where the general law of contract has been modified or supplemented by a 
context-specific legal regime. We should consider the dynamics of this legal regulation, 
how it came to be enacted, how it operates in practice, and how it seeks to overcome the 
inherent challenges of regulating commercial contracts. We should give greater 
consideration to the ways in which theories of regulation may be relevant to theories of 
contract law.  
 The examination of these issues through an in-depth study of the HGCRA has 
demonstrated that the regulation of contracts need not be paternalist or welfarist in the 
narrow sense of seeking to improve substantive fairness or protect weaker parties as an 
end in itself. Regulation might seek to rebalance power within a given category of 
contracts as a means to an end, such as the facilitation of more trusting and co-operative 
relations in the regulated sector. It has also shown that legal regulation need not involve 
the rigid imposition of external norms or allocations of substantive rights and 
obligations. It can instead operate reflexively, imposing procedural requirements 
designed to influence but not directly control the parties’ self-regulation through the 
terms of their contract. And, finally, it has shown how regulation can mitigate the twin 
risks of having no impact at all on the regulated practice, or of having an unanticipated 
negative impact, if it is responsive as well as reflexive.  
 The concept of responsive reflexivity developed in this chapter is not a complete 
answer to Teubner’s regulatory trilemma, because it poses a distinctive challenge to the 
trilemma’s third limb, the risk that law will lose the distinctiveness and coherence of its 
own discourse. Responsive reflexivity challenges the classical idea of contract law as a 
set of generally applicable rules and principles because it is more likely to involve the 
creation of particular rules for particular contract types. However, we should not 
overstate the importance of this classical idea, given the extent to which modern English 
contract law already contains such context-specific rules and principles. Although 
academic accounts of contract law focus on rules of general application, the leading 
practitioner textbook, Chitty on Contracts,181 consists of two volumes of roughly equal 
size, dealing with ‘General Principles’ and ‘Specific Contracts’ respectively. And in 
practice, many different types of commercial contract attract their own cadres of 
specialist lawyers who rely principally on their own specialist textbooks and pursue 
                                                             
180 See for example Macaulay (n 2) 63–64 and Beale and Dugdale, ‘Contracts Between 
Businessmen’ (1975) 47–48 and 51–52. 
181 H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd edn (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2018). 
1 
 
litigation in specialist courts.182 We should also balance the urge for coherence in legal 
discourse against the practical consequences which, as events leading to the HGCRA 
demonstrate, can ensue when legal rules are insufficiently responsive to the needs of a 
particular sphere of commerce.  
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